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I Articles I
Human Rights and Legal Education in the




There appears to be a trend towards convergence of individual human
rights norms. Universal individual human rights has become an
increasingly accepted part of the institutional norms of nations in the
Western Hemisphere. Educators across the Americas have an
important, perhaps critical, role to play in the internalization of
universal individual human rights norms within the legal systems of
the nations of the Americas. Law schools best serve this role by
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incorporating human rights education into the core curriculum in
every law school in the region. But, the human rights mission of
legal institutions in the Americas faces serious challenges, which are
explored in this paper. In the United States, individual rights is still
assumed to be a wholly endogenous product, the source of which is
limited to federal and state constitutions. Human rights education is
marginalized, confined to the ghetto of specialization within the
fields of international and comparative law. In Latin America, the
opposite is true. Human rights is taught, but as the universalizing
product of exogenous origin and control. The rich human rights
traditions of Latin American nations are marginalized. The result is
the construction of a rights edifice that is foreign, a hollow
internationalism. Nevertheless, the problem of legal parochialism
and hollow universalism can be overcome and the paper concludes by
offering some examples and suggestions of methods by which this
process can be started.
Since 1999, the Section on Graduate Programs for Foreign Lawyers
of the American Association of Law Schools has sponsored an annual
dialogue between academics in the Americas.' Over the years, this
dialogue has been fruitful in a number of respects.2 The topic for 2002 -
Human Rights and Legal Education - was particularly appropriate as the
world nears the end of the United Nation's Decade for Human Rights
Education. 3 It was also particularly well suited to the moderator of this
dialogue, Dean Claudio Grossman, whose law school has been at the
forefront of bringing human rights education to the Americas through
Washington College of Law's Center for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law.4
This conversation is meant to provide an opportunity to share views
"on the important issues facing human rights as a part of standard legal
1. Claudio Grossman, Human Rights and Legal Education in the Western
Hemisphere, Graduate Programs for Foreign Lawyers, AALS Section Newsletter, Fall
2001 at 4 (copy on file with author).
2. See American Association of Law Schools, Section on Graduate Programs for
Foreign Lawyers, Annual Meeting (2000) (seminars included Emerging Worldwide
Strategies in Internationalizing Legal Education, The Quest for Consensus on LL.M.
Standards, and Transnational Legal Practice: Regulatory Hurdles), available at
http://www.aals.org/am2000/schedule.html.
3. United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education, U.N. GAOR, 49t" Sess.,
Agenda Item 100(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/184 (1995). The decade for human rights
education ends in 2005. The resolution declaring the commencement of this decade
urged states to use education as a means by which people 'learn respect for the dignity of
others and the means and methods of ensuring that respect in all societies." Id.
4. For a hint of the activities of the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, see, e.g., Natasha Concepci6n, Center News: Promoting Human Rights Education
in the Americas, 7 HUM. RTs. BR. 30 (1999) (describing a training seminar for human
rights law professors in 1999).
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education" 5 within the Americas. This sharing presupposes a number of
understandings and assumptions. First, human rights is directly related
to positive law. 6 Second, among those actors within a nation with power
to affect positive law, law schools must serve "as institutions promoting
fairness and justice in society.",7 Third, as a consequence of this mission,
"human rights education should be part of the core curriculum in every
law school in the region." 8 Lastly, the human rights mission of legal
institutions in the Americas faces serious challenges, particularly the
battle from the predilection among even the most well-meaning
governments in the Americas to ignore or apply human rights to suit their
5. Id. For my purposes here, I will understand human rights to include all "rights
held equally by every individual by virtue of his or her humanity, and for no other reason.
Human rights are non-derogable claims against both society and the state that are not
contingent upon performance of specific duties." Rhonda E. Howard, Cultural
Absolutism and the Nostalgiafor Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993).
6. Id. ("While human rights is obviously an important issue, the teaching of human
rights law lags."). However, one should keep in mind what Alfred Rubin noted: "The
bottom line of positive law is not justice but authority. The issue with regard to the
positive law is always who... has the authority to define the offense, to determine if it
has occurred, and to demand ... a 'legal' result of that determination." Alfred P. Rubin,
Enforcing the Rules of International Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 157 (1993).
There is a rich and complicated discourse respecting this assumption. For a discussion in
the context of human rights, see, e.g., Rubin, supra, Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty
and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 417 (2000), Joy
Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: The History and Meaning of its Politicization, 23
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 689 (1998). The discussion is not unknown within the context of
American constitutional law. See, e.g., Charles R. Kesler, Natural Law and a Limited
Constitution, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 549 (1995). The original debate on the need for a
federal Bill of Rights touches on this assumption. See, e.g., IRA GLASSER, VISIONS OF
LIBERTY: THE BILL OF RIGHTS FOR ALL AMERICANS (Arcade Pub., 1991). The modem
discussion on the nature of 'rights' within modem constitutional interpretation is one of
the more important modem expressions of the difficulties inherent in this assumption.
For judicial discourse, compare Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For academic discourse, see, e.g.,
DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (Oxford 2000).
7. Claudio Grossman, Human Rights and Legal Education in the Western
Hemisphere, Graduate Programs for Foreign Lawyers, AALS Section Newsletter, Fall
2001 at 4 (copy on file with author).
There are a number of international instruments that seek to secure a privileged place for
education. For example, Section 5(l)(a) of the Convention Against Discrimination in
Education, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 provides that:
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
it shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations,
racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations
for the maintenance of peace.
For a brief discussion of education rights in international instruments, see Lynda Frost,
Human Rights Education Programs for Indigenous Peoples: Teaching Whose Human
Rights?, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 699, 703-706 (1995).
8. Id.
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own purposes. 9
Law schools in the Americas are particularly well suited to the task
of internalizing a universal human rights normative structure within the
cultures of the civil and common law and among lawyers, judges,
bureaucrats, legislatures, and political executives, many of whom are
lawyers. 10 But law schools across the Americas are hardly ready to
participate effectively in the process of human rights convergence. On
the one hand, law schools continue to support systems of parochialism
which resist the introduction of any universalist notions into national
rights discourse. On the other hand, law schools teach a human rights
universalism in a form which is alien to the local legal culture and which
provides little effective means for bridging the distance between the local
legal culture and an intrusive alien universalism.
9. Id. Thus, Dean Grossman notes, among the serious issues of human rights in the
Americas, the imposition of death sentences on minors, the murder of journalists,
domestic violence against women, and incarceration without sentence. Id. Indeed, there
are international agreements, some aspirational and some with at least limited binding
effect but in various stages of approval, that touch on these topics. See, e.g., Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, UN GAOR, 3' Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
21st Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21' t Sess., U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Convention on the Political Rights of
Women of 1952, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (1981); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
GAOR, 3 9th Sess., Supp. No. 51. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984); Convention on the
Rights of the Child of 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 61st plen. Mtg., at 166, U.N.
Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
10. There is a strong tradition of politically charged education within the Americas.
In the United States, the political thrust of that education has been to serve the social,
economic and political elites. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). Traditionally, in Latin
America, the political thrust of that education has been conservative and sometimes
religiously oriented to the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. See, e.g., Laura M.
Padilla, Latinas and Religion: Subordination or State of Grace?, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
973 (2000) (assimilation to European standards was attempted through education in Latin
America); Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights in Latin America, 10 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 173 (1996) (Catholic Church had a religious and educational near monopoly in
Latin America until the late 20 th century). Since the Second World War, the great
advances in education as a political project have come from the left. See, e.g., PAULO
FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos, trans., 20 th Anniversary
ed., The Continuum Pub. Co., 1993) (1970). See generally, Philippa Bobbett, Human
Rights Education and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Variety of Approaches, in
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION 219 (Hugh Starkey, ed., 1991); UNITED
NATIONS, TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS: PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES FOR PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1989). In the United States there has also been considerable
discussion of the civic mission of educational establishments generally. See, e.g., R.
FREEMAN BuTTS, THE CIVIC MISSION IN EDUCATION REFORM: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE
PUBLIC AND THE PROFESSION (1989).
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This essay examines the reality of human rights education within
the Americas based on an acceptance of the assumptions about the
teaching mission of law schools with respect to human rights and the
relationship of that teaching mission to an assumed obligation of law
schools to participate in the development of positive law. Section I
introduces the problem of legal parochialism and hollow universalism as
impediments to the internalization of universal individual human rights
norms in the Americas. Section II provides the detail, setting out the
way in which curricular choices and categorizations within the United
States, and course methodologies within Latin America, impede
advancement of human rights education. Section III offers suggestions
for remediation. These suggestions point only toward first steps in a
long process of changing natural cultural conceptions of human rights as
something arcane, apart, and alien into an accepted reality among all
peoples of the Americas.
1. The Structural Problem: Legal Parochialism and Hollow
Internationalism
The world has been moving slowly toward a grudging acceptance of
globalism in a variety of fields. If globalization is the great postulate of
the twenty-first century socio-economic organization, its great corollary
is legal convergence.ll The imperatives of modem commerce have been
a great engine of globalism, extending even into 'non-capitalist'
strongholds like the People's Republic of China.12 Legal education, as
well, has seen the beginnings of attempts to respond positively to the
forces of convergence and globalization.' 3  Convergence has come
slowly in other areas as well. Starting with the United Nation's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 14 there has been an accelerating
11. For an excellent short discussion, see Michael Mussa, Factors Driving Global
Economic Integration, presented in Jackson Hole, Wyoming at a symposium sponsored
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City on "Global Opportunities and Challenges,"
August 25, 2000, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/082500
.htm>
12. China's entry into the World Trade Organization system, and its adoption of
corporations codes, are strong indicators of the power of globalist trade to compel
compliance with emerging worldwide standards of economic conduct. For a general
discussion, see, e.g., Robert C. Art and Minkang Gu, China Incorporated. the First
Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273 (1995).
13. For example, in 2000, the Association of American Law Schools convened a
"watershed conference, believed to be the first of its kind ever held, [to highlight] the
world's diverse systems of law and legal education and explore the desirability and
feasibility of greater global cooperation among legal educators." John Sexton and Carl
C. Monk, Introduction: Papers From the La Pietra Conference of International Legal
Educators, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2001).
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, UN GAOR, 3 Sess.,
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trend, especially within the Americas, to embrace a universal normative
structure for defining the rights of individuals. 15 Convergence of notions
of individual human rights has not had the sort of successes that have
marked worldwide international economic integration,' 6 but there is a
noticeable inclination of governmental institutions across the Americas
to at least acknowledge de jure the importance of protecting individual
human rights. 
17
Underlying the discussion of human rights, at least within the
Americas, is the view expressed by Jerome Shestack that: fundamental
human rights principles have become universal by virtue of their entry
into international law as jus cogens, customary law, or by convention. In
other words, the relativist argument has been overtaken by the fact that
human rights have become hegemonic and therefore essentially global by
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
15. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the most well known of the
human rights instruments proceeding from the United Nations. Less well known is the
increasing number of human rights related conventions which have been created through
the United Nations from around the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration.
These conventions, unlike the Universal Declaration, have been meant to have a direct
effect on the legal obligations of nations toward each other and toward the individuals
that inhabit the lands these states rule. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of GenocideU.N. GAOR, 3 rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
For a complete list of United Nations Declarations and Conventions regarding human
rights, see, United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, available at
http://www.unhchr.chhtml/intlinst.htm.
16. Domestic application of universal principles of individual human rights has been
attacked on a number of grounds. They include the arguments that human rights cannot
be universal because there is no evidence of a base of human rights protections within all
of the indigenous cultures of the globe either in principle or in fact and that, as a result,
the only universal characteristic of human rights norms must be that transcendent human
rights norms cannot exist - and thus that it is infeasible to devise a single set of universal
human rights norms. For a critical discussion with an extended description of these
arguments, see Rhonda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for
Community, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993). The problems are especially acute with
respect to the rights of minorities. See, e.g., David Wippman, The Evolution and
Implementation of Minority Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 597 (1997) (arguing that
minority rights issues are too context sensitive for anything but application of a limited
set of general principles, like non-discrimination, to majority-minority disputes within a
nation-state).
17. In Costa Rica, "international agreements have become as important a source of
human rights guarantees in Costa Rica as is the Constitution of 1949 and, indeed, that
international human rights law, as a practical and juridical matter, has become part of
Costa Rican constitutional law." Robert S. Barker, Judicial Review in Costa Rica:
Evolution and Recent Developments, 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 267, 286 (2000).
Moreover, since the overthrow of the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile in the 1980s,
there has been a greater institutional embrace of human rights within the Americas. See,
e.g. Jonathan M. Miller, Evaluating the Argentine Supreme Court Under Presidents
Alfonsin And Menem, (1983-1999), 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 369 (2000); Katherine M.
Culliton, Legal Remedies for Domestic Violence in Chile and the United States: Cultural
Relativism, Myths, and Realities, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 183 (1994).
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fiat. "
This hegemony of human rights finds particular expression within
the Americas through a cluster of human rights instruments binding on
the members of the Organization of American States. 19 Thus, for
example, the signatories of the OAS Charter - including the United
States - have pledged to achieve what is described in general terms as
the "equitable distribution of national income," "proper nutrition," and
"adequate housing for all sectors of the population. '20 All OAS
18. Jerome J. Shestack, The Legal Profession and Human Rights: Globalization of
Human Rights Law, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 558, 568 (1997). At the time the remarks
were delivered, Mr. Shestack was the President of the American Bar Association, a
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and past
chair of the IBA Standing Committee on Human Rights. For the historical context in
which declarations such as these seem unproblematic, see B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE
CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FORTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION (1988); Louis SOHN, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM ROOSEVELT'S FOUR FREEDOMS TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1995).
This idea of human rights hegemony has been attacked on a variety of grounds:
religious, see, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value, 91 A.J.LL
593 (1997) (discussing post WWII politics in Islamic countries as they confronted and
struggled with "Western ideals"); Surya P. Subedi, Are the Principles of Human Rights
'Western' Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the 'Asian' Concept of Human Rights
From the Perspective of Hinduism, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 45 (1999) (the universality of
human rights can be found in the universal values of the Hindu faith); ethno-cultural, see,
e.g., Bilahari Kausikan, Asian versus 'Universal' Human Rights, 7 RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 9 (1997); MAHATHIR MOHAMMAD & SHINTARO ISHIHARA, THE VOICE OF
ASIA: Two LEADERS DIscuss THE COMING CENTURY (Frank Baldwin, trans. 1995)
("Western societies are riddled with single-parent families, which foster incest, with
homosexuality, with cohabitation, with unrestrained avarice, with disrespect for others
and, of course, with rejection religious teachings and values." Id., at 80); political, see,
e.g., Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law: Speaking Law to
Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2000) (suggesting the need for equality among states in constructing
international normative orders).
19. These include the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed April
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 48 (1952) (entered into force
for the United States December 13, 1951) (hereafter the OAS Charter), as amended by
the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed
February 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (hereafter the "Buenos Aires
Protocol"), the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2, 1948,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser L./V/II. 23. Doc. 21, rev. 6 (English 1979) (hereafter the
"Rights and Duties Declaration"), and the American Convention on Human Rights,
signed November 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L./V/II. 23 doc. 21, rev. 2 (English 1979) (hereafter
"American Convention"). OAS documents can be accessed at http://www.oas.org. For
excellent materials on this system, geared to students, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL AND
DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS
(4th ed. 1995). The United States has signed and ratified the OAS Charter, and has
approved the Rights and Duties Declaration, but has neither signed nor ratified the
American Convention.
20. OAS Charter, supra note 18, art. 31 1(b), (), (k).
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signatory nations also acknowledge that their nationals are entitled to
"material well being.., under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality
of opportunity, and economic security., 21 The civil and political rights
accorded to individuals under the American Convention on Human
Rights are meant to be incorporated within the constitutional traditions of
the signatory states. 22 These rights are generally enforceable through a
system of quasi-judicial proceedings before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and in the national courts of the signatory states.23
Indeed, supra-national entities have appeared at the forefront of
movements to articulate and enforce systems of human rights since the
Second World War. It is commonly accepted, at least among the
Western intellectual elite in Europe and the Americas, that the "ideal of
human rights requires a world which transcends nationalism and state
sovereignty in favor of a more universalist outlook, a more cosmopolitan
approach which perceives the individual person as enjoying certain rights
and privileges apart from the confines of his citizenship. 24  Thus,
regional systems of human rights, along with the rights-convention
system of the United Nations, have provided the bulk of the articulation
of 'universally' cognizable rights. The most progressive states now
appear to have imposed on themselves constitutional mandates that
require national institutions to look outside of themselves for a standard
of fundamental human rights enforceable within their territories.25 Other
21. Id.,art43(a).
22. American Convention, art. 2, provides:
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is
not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties
undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.
23. American Convention, arts. 34-40 (Commission); arts. 52-69 (Court). See Jo M.
Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and
Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INT-AM. L. REv. 297 (1995); Holly Dawn
Jarmul, Note The effects of decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National
Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1995-96). The system is similar to that used
to enforce the European Convention on Human Rights. For a discussion, see, e.g., Martin
A. Olz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems, 28
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 307 (1997); Laurence R. Heifer, Forum Shopping for
Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 285 (1999); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 11 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
24. Ranee K.L. Panjabi, Review Essay, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 229, 230 (1995)
(reviewing JACK DONNELLY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1990S: PROMISE OR PERIL?
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS).
25. The Republic of South Africa and the Argentine Republic are two cases in point.
For a discussion of the constitutionalization of a comparative/supra-national approach to
basic rights within domestic law in Argentina, see, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, The
Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 Colum. J.
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political entities, such as the European Union, have incorporated human
rights norms within -their constitutional framework from the
constitutional traditions of their member states and the articulation of
rights in regional human rights systems.2 6
But there may be no hegemony of supra-nationally derived and
maintained rights in fact within the Americas. There may be no unity of
purpose, no singular vision, shared among legal academic institutions in
the Americas. There may be no push to include a singular set of
universally accepted and uniformly interpreted human rights in fact
within the academic curriculum of many law schools. Convergence of a
unified and universalistic set of human rights norms requires more than
the declarations of the political branches of government and the adoption
of treaties or conventions at the state-to-state level. Convergence of the
sort described at the beginning of this essay require that individuals and
state institutions together internalize the same normative structure of
individual human rights, at least at some level of meaningful generality.
27
Transnat'l L.281 (1999); Jonathon M. Miller, the Authority of a Foreign Talisman: a
Study of U.S. Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and
the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith 46 Am. U.L. Rev. 1483 (1997). For South Africa,
see, e.g., S. Aft. Const. ch. 2 § 36(1) (1996); Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658
(CC); Ferreira v. Levin, 1995 (4) BCLR 437 (W). For commentary, see, e.g., Jeremy
Sarkin, the Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of
Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176 (1998);
Hoyt Webb, the Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and
Comparative Constitutional Law, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998); Johan D. van der
Vyver, Comparative Constitutionalism: Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South
Africa, 40 EMORY L.J. 745, 823 (1991).
26. The European Court of Justice has long held to that view. The ECJ interprets
Member State obligations under the treaties establishing the European Union in the basis
of general principles of law of which fundamental rights form a significant part. For that
purpose, the ECJ "is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to
Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with
fundamental rights recognized and protected by the constitutions of those states.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines ... "
Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491, [1974] 2 CMLR 338. Since the 1970s,
the European Union has moved to incorporate fundamental rights into black letter law,
albeit still indirectly. See, e.g., Grdinne de Bjfrca, The Language of Rights and European
Integration, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, (G. More and Jo Shaw,
eds., Clarendon Press, 1995).
27. This, of course, is the conventional stance in the legal academic literature. On
the importance of internalization see, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International
Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 642 (1998) (describing internalization of international
norms within nation states); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824 (1998) (discussing the usual American course of
dealing with customary international law); Edward M. Morgan, Internalization of
Customary International Law: An Historical Perspective, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 63 (1987).
Internalization requires more than a change in cultural understanding and practice. In
many nations, internalization requires implementation through national legislation and
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This sort of necessary converging internalization is little in evidence
in the Americas. Although the Charter of the OAS proclaims that "the
education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom and
peace, ' 28 there are no specific obligations respecting education within the
great treaty systems of the Americas; especially those of the
Organization of American States.29 Moreover, even the basic legal
impediments to convergence remain significant. Thus, for example, the
United States has not signed nor ratified the American Convention, and
has taken the position that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of either
body. In addition, the institutions of the OAS cannot appropriate for
themselves the right to interpret the hortatory provisions of the Rights
and Duties Declaration.
30
The United States Supreme Court has expressed the view that law
or conceptions of rights not domestically produced, have no place within
constitutional or other 'rights' discourse. 31  That U.S. courts might
enforcement through national courts and administrative agencies. Most international
obligations of the United States are not given direct effect. See Stefan Riesenfeld, The
Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable German Judgment, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 548 (1971) (suggesting an approach to determination if provisions of
international agreements are self-executing; id., at 550).
28. OAS Charter, supra note 18, at art. 5, I, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
29. The American Convention on Human Rights does not include specific
requirements respecting either education in general or human rights education
specifically. However, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.
Treaty ser. 69, reprinted in JIL.M. 156 (1989), requires that education "should strengthen
respect for human right, ideological pluralism, fundamental freedoms, justice and
peace.., and should foster understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations
and all racial, ethnic or religious groups." Id, at art. 13.
30. WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
512-516 (2nd ed. 1995). For a list of states that have signed, ratified, and as ratified
deposited with the OAS General Secretariat the American Convention, see OAS,
Secretariat for Legal Affairs, Department of Legal Cooperation & Information, American
Convention on Human Rights, Signatures and Ratifications, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2002). The
United States is not alone. There are a number of other OAS members that have not
signed or ratified the American Convention. Even among those OAS states that have
signed and ratified, such ratifications have been limited, to a certain extent, by
reservations made by the ratifying party. See OAS, Secretariat for Legal Affairs,
Department of Legal Cooperation & Information, American Convention on Human
Rights, Signatures and Ratifications, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english
/Sigs/b-32.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
3 1. American courts remain fiercely dualist. For a recent case illustrating this view
of the majority of the current Court, see Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (even
though Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was violated, the conviction and
execution were upheld because the petitioner did not raise the consular visitation issue in
state court). For a discussion of dualism and monism in international law, see, e.g.,
LouIs HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUEs 64-67 (1995). At least one
commentator has argued that while the federal courts, at least, continue to apply
traditional dualist principles where international norms and constitutional principles are
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appear increasingly aberrational in this respect 32 does not make the
distinction between endogenous 'law' and exogenous 'rights' any less
significant in U.S. rights jurisprudence. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has developed a series of legal doctrines, sometimes
commonly known as the plenary power doctrine,33 -that has had the effect
of creating a virtually impenetrable wall that effectively divides the
domestic human rights regime available only to US citizens and residents
within these walls, from other regimes of rights to which others may seek
such comfort as may be available to them.34 And, of course, within the
territory of the United States, this is cold comfort indeed, since
international rights regimes are not applicable to outsiders, but outsiders
are not generally accorded the rights available to citizens and residents in
some circumstances.35
implicated in a case, many legal academics have abandoned dualism in favor of
something approaching monism. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999). Dualist
principles may be reflected in our federalism jurisprudence as well. See Printz v. U.S.,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Knight v. Florida and Moore v. Nebraska, 120 S. Ct. 459 (1999) (denial of
cert.). See generally, Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 816-820 (2000). For monism in approaching U.S. law, see, e.g.,
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996). For
the view that the old dualism versus monism debate is increasingly irrelevant in a
globalizing world of supranational entities, see Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or
Basic Law? The Decline of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
253 (2001).
32. For a discussion of what other courts are doing, see, e.g., The International
Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation 114
Harv. L. Rev. 2049 (2001); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law? The
Decline of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 276 et seq.
(2001).
33. Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (affirming governmental authority to exclude
certain classes of people from entry into the territory of the U.S., even the excluded
shared those characteristics with U.S. citizens who could not be excluded); Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Wing v. U.S. 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (aliens entitled to trial
before punishment). See, e.g., Natsu Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship,
"Foreignness", and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 Or.L. Rev. 261 (1997)
(discussing the treatment of foreigners and aliens in the U.S. with particular emphasis on
persons of Asian descent).
34. Of course, the United States is not unique in this respect. The recently passed
anti-terrorism legislation adopted by the United Kingdom Parliament was recently struck
down for discrimination in application between citizens and non-citizens. See, e.g.,
Audrey Gillian, Detention of 11 Suspects Unlawful, Judges Rule, THE GUARDIAN
(London), July 31, 2002, at 1.
35. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). For an interesting
interpretation of that case in light of the possibility of incremental movement by the
Supreme Court, see Mark Tushnet, Federalism and International Human Rights in the
New Constitutional Order, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 841 (2001). A recent example that
demonstrates the substantial reach of this human rights scheme was the attempt in the
1996 reform of welfare, to exclude from the provision of benefits not only undocumented
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The political branches of the United States government follow a
similar path. For example, having withdrawn from the attempt to
harmonize and globalize the criminal law of human rights through the
establishment of an elaborate system of prosecuting and trying various
forms of individual criminal behavior, 36 the United States is currently
seeking agreements from other states that would protect American
nationals from the jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court.37
U.S. law schools serve a pivotal role in perpetuating the American
Supreme Court's current division of rights discourse as a natural division
of law.38 Our curricula normalizes the great division between, on the one
hand, domestic law and the rights of citizens and permanent residents of
the United States and, on the other hand, rights available to outsiders.
39
The foundation of fundamental rights in the United States is presumed to
be the Federal Constitution - a product of domestic development. 40 The
immigrants but also certain otherwise lawful residents of the United States. For a
discussion, see, e.g., Larry Cat6 Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: An Essay on the
Futility of "Ending Welfare as We Know It, " 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1995).
For a discussion of the problem in the context of the application of U.S. law to events
taking place outside the United States, see, e.g., Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of
U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 307
(2002).
36. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (1998) 37 I.L.M. 999 (the "Rome Statute"). The Rome Statute is reproduced in M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998). For
general discussion of the Rome Statute, see, e.g., the collected works in THE ROME
STATUTE FO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi,
eds., Ashgate Pubs. 2001).
37. For accounts in the popular press about this activity, see, e.g., Christopher
Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield Its Peacekeepers: Response to New Court,
Romania and Israel Are First to Agree Not to Extradite Americans for Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A-1.
38. This is among the most important and basic roles of law schools within the field
of legal production in the United States. For a discussion see, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). In a
very general sense, law schools are an important mechanism for the institutionalization,
the perpetuation, and the replication, through thousands of interactions between counsel
and their clients (without the necessity of judicial intervention), of "the Norm." MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 184 (Alan Sheridan,
trans., 1977; Vintage Books 1995) (1975).
39. As the actions of the Justice Department under John Ashcroft have amply
demonstrated since the terrorist actions of September 11, 2001, the fundamental rights of
the citizens and lawful residents of the United States are, for the moment, different from
those accorded to others. See, e.g., Timothy Roche, A Short Course in Miracles, TIME,
July 29, 2002, at 34 (the American Taliban, John Walker Lindh, and the Justice
Department entered into a plea agreement where Lindh would serve no more than 20
years.), Roy Gutman, Guantanamo Justice?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 34 (the
suspected members of Al Qaeda held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay do not
have a right to a trial or a lawyer, and the Geneva Convention and the U.S. Constitution
do not apply).
40. As the discussion that follows in Part il, infra, suggests in more detail, elite law
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foundation of fundamental human rights in other nations, on the other
hand, is made up of the charters of rights recognized as fundamental and
universal by supra-national organizations - products of exogenous
'civilization' 41 which has had to be pressed onto the parochial political
traditions of these states.42 Human rights education is necessary - but it
is a subject of study of others. The academics of the United States of
America have no need of any sort of personal relationship with human
rights - we have our constitution to protect us. Internationally based
human rights are for foreigners; fundamental rights are a creature of
necessity devised to protect other societies against their own excesses.
All societies must adhere to a regime of fundamental human rights. In
the United States, those rights have their sources in the domestic sphere -
schools in the United States pride themselves on the number of courses offered on the
fundamental rights of citizens and residents of the United States - all of these courses are
based on the federal, or state constitutions. These courses are identified by a number of
titles - 'constitutional rights,' 'religion,' 'civil rights,' 'First Amendment law,' and the
like. None of them are identified as courses on 'human' rights.
41. The reference here is to the distinction between communal folk ways
(Gemeinschaft) and society or social ordering at the greatest level of organizational
generality (Gesellschaft), made a century ago by Ferdinand Tonnies. See FERDINAND
TONNiES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 223-235 (Charles P. Loomis, ed. & trans., Harper
Torchbooks, 1963) (GEMENSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (1887)).
42. For those academics in the Americas who toady to the increasingly anachronistic
icons of third world rhetoric of a bygone age or who echo the emerging racist or
religionist jingoism of Asia, Africa or the worlds of Islam, all of which are uncomfortable
with universals, the human rights of other states must proceed from the social, ethnic or
religious 'constitutions' of those states or their constituent communities. Here, ironically,
is fertile ground for the crafting of apologia for the 'human rights' regimes of Fidel
Castro and the rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This discourse, of course, reflects
the criticisms of the great advances in articulations of fundamental human rights within
the international community. These criticisms have their greatest champions in people
purporting to speak for religious, ethnic, or racial communities outside of the
Europeanized Western Hemisphere, Christian Europe proper, and Israel. The current
prime minister of Malaysia along with a long time member of the Japanese Parliament
wrote a widely circulated work in this vein. See MAHATHIR MOHAMMAD & SHINTARO
ISHIHARA, THE VOICE OF ASIA: Two LEADERS DISCUSS THE COMING CENTURY (Frank
Baldwin, trans. 1995). Clifford Geertz long ago suggested the fallacies of the approaches
of the 'relativists' within the context of the search for human universals when he
observed that the point should not be that:
there are no generalizations that can be made about man as man, save that he is
a most various animal, or that the study of culture has nothing to contribute
toward the uncovering of such generalizations. My point is that such
generalizations are not to be discovered through a Baconian search for cultural
universals, a kind of public-opinion polling of the world's peoples in search of
a consensus gentium that does not in fact exist, and, further, that the attempt to
do so leads to precisely the sort of relativism the whole approach was expressly
designed to avoid.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 40 (Basic Books, 2000) (1973).
For a different view, see, e.g., DONALD BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALISTS (1991) (some
base concepts are universal to all cultures and these universals form a diverse set best
understood through the lens of human biology and evolutionary psychology).
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human rights are wholly endogenous.43
Within the rest of the Americas, or at least that part of the Americas
south of the Rio Grande, those rights are exogenous. Courts and law
schools begin with the premise that individual human rights are received
from outside the nation-state, much like Moses received the law of Israel
from God.44 Outside imposition is necessary for those nation-states
whose normative structures were deemed devoid of any strong
continuing tradition of such rights. Moreover, the perceived lack of a
sufficiently robust indigenous human rights tradition also suggested that
such states were incapable of sustaining regimes of individual human
rights on their own. 4 5 As a consequence, such human rights regimes are
43. There are some interesting consequences, not the least important of which are
the imperviousness of U.S. courts to arguments based on emerging international norms,
or even the common approaches adopted by other states. This resistance has been
particularly acute in the area of the law applicable to indigenous peoples, and those
applicable to sexual non-conformists and people condemned to death. In these cases, at
least, it has been common to reject the idea that international norms have any
applicability to decisions in the U.S. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (capital punishment for sixteen and seventeen year olds is not a violation of the 8th
Amendment; "It is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, in reviewing
Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment." Id.; Rowland v. Mad River
Local School Dist., cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (high school guidance counselor
fired because she was a homosexual who revealed her sexual preference); Knight v.
Florida, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (the court declined to consider the many
foreign courts who have found that a lengthy delay in administering a lawful death
penalty rendered ultimate execution inhumane, degrading, or unusually cruel). For a
critique of American judicial reluctance to avail itself of 'comparative jurisprudence,' see
Rebecca Lefler, Note: A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as
Persuasive Authority By the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada,
and the High Court ofAustralia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 165 (2002).
44. Exodus 20:1-17 (10 Commandments). This is an important normative statement.
For many cultures, including some significant elements of U.S. culture, the reception of
law from an outside, authoritative force, is the ultimate expression of legitimacy. For a
discussion in a variety of contexts, see, e.g., James W. Gordon, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 317
(2001) ("Harlan believed in the collective wisdom of ordinary people not because they
were good, but because the United States, with its divinely inspired Constitution, was
God's instrument. Harlan's faith in Providence and his conviction that the United States
was God's chosen vehicle for the liberation of mankind complemented his direct political
experience." Id., at 369); David Ray Papke, The American Legal Faith: Traditions,
Contradictions and Possibilities, 30 IND. L. REv. 645 (1997) ("Between 1800 and 1850
schoolbooks routinely spoke of the Constitution as divinely inspired and glorious." Id., at
650). In the West, moral and principles of positive law have replaced the commanding
power of divine law, at least within the official organs of state organization. For a
discussion of the Western World at the cusp of this change, see, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin,
International Law in the Age of Columbus, 39 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 5 (1992).
45. With respect to the right of free expression, see, e.g., Claudio Grossman,
Libertad de expresion en el sistema interamericano de proteccion de los derechos
humanos, 7 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 755 (2000) (La proteccion de los derechos
humanos se ha desarrollado desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial como consecuencia del
fracaso tragico de un orden internacional basado en la soberania absoluta. Mientras se
desarrolla la proteccion internacional de los derechos humanos, se han adoptado normas
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not only imposed from outside, but must remain controlled by elements
outside the nation-state. To this extent, then, the necessary pre-condition
to the adoption of individual human rights outside of the United States is
a loss, by the state, of sovereign authority over the individual and the
compulsory assimilation of normative structures alien to the traditional
political and social organization of the nation. Universal individual
human rights, then, is something foreign, received from a superior
force,46 to be absorbed by local elements in power who are kindly
disposed to these normative structures.4 7 It is not necessarily initially
natural to the nation on which it is imposed.48
The other-worldliness of this imposition also serves as a source of
resistance by local elements. Moses may have brought down the Law as
received from God, but the people of Israel appeared content at the time
to worship a golden calf of its own creation. 49 Likewise, reception of an
alien, and unalterable regime of universal individual human rights can be
resisted overtly on local, national, ethnic, and religious grounds - as neo-
colonialism in the form of cultural imperialism. 50 But resistance can be
y creado instituciones a nivel internacional para vigilar el proceso. Id., at 758).
46. In the case of the Americas, this superior force is the Organization of American
States and its treaty and convention system. To some extent, it is also enforced by other
superior bodies - the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Import-
Export Bank, may also compel, on a state by state basis, the adoption of certain
normative structures as part of their loan agreements. These function much like negative
and positive covenants in a standard bank loan in the United States. For a discussion of
the ways in which these lending bodies introduce and enforce normative conduct rules on
client states, see, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, Should the International Financial Institutions
Play a Role in the Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law?,
50 U. KAN. L. REv. 695 (2002); Daniel D. Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited
Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF,
17 HuM. RTS. Q. 411 (1995). For a discussion of the economic value of human rights,
see, Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002).
47. The Argentine example is telling. See, e.g., CARLOS NINo, THE ETHICS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1991).
48. The notion of naturalization of rights or norms is well established in European
theory. See, e.g. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
184 (Alan Sheridan, trans., 1977; Vintage Books 1995) (1975). It has made inroads even
within conventional American legal writing, at least with respect to writings in
'international law.' See, e.g., Koh, Bringing Internacional Law Home, supra note 26.
49. Exodus 32:1-35.
50. See, e.g., MAHATHIR MOHAMMAD & SHINTARO ISHIHARA, THE VOICE OF ASIA:
Two LEADERS DISCUSS THE COMING CENTURY (Frank Baldwin, trans. 1995). Mr.
Mahathir, the current Prime Minister of Malaysia, and Mr. Ishihara, a Japanese politician,
defend what they describe as an Eastern approach to prosperity as against the West's
"moral degeneration":
The community has given way to the individual and his desires. The inevitable
consequence has been the breakdown of established institutions and diminished
respect for marriage, family values, elders, and important customs, conventions
and traditions .... Hence Western societies are riddled with single-parent
families, which foster incest, with homosexuality, with cohabitation, with
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subtle as well; it is not uncommon for nation-states forced to adopt alien
standards to turn them into hollow norms. 1 Some Latin American courts
appear ready to follow this example - a ready willingness to ignore this
alien law of the land.
Outside of gatherings like ours, then, it appears that universal
human rights as theory or practice is far from forming an integral part of
behavior norms of the peoples of the Americas. Legal parochialism and
a hollow internationalism seem to be the norm, each providing a
substantial basis for resisting any regime of universal individual human
rights. Yet, both the parochialism of the United States and the formal
internationalism of Latin America and Canada contain within them
powerful positive insights that can serve as the basis of a successful
program of social construction based on human rights. A blending of
both is required. Combining the universalizing project of the individual
unrestrained avarice, with disrespect for others and, of course, with rejection
religious teachings and values.
Id., at 80. Scholars in South and East Asia tend to share these views to an extent. For a
description, see, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Forward: Symposium on East Asian
Approaches to Human Rights, 2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 193 (1995-96). For a response to the
claims of human rights imperialism and neo-colonialism, see, e.g., Dianne Otto,
Rethinking the Universality of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1
(1997).
51. The example of Japan during the Allied Occupation is a case in point. While the
Allied powers forced the Japanese to adopt a series of Western styles laws, many of these
were honored only in the breach or reinterpreted in a way that substantially gutted the
law. In many other cases, the laws remained honored only in the breach - when it was
necessary to demonstrate to the outside powers the good faith of the conquered. For a
discussion, see, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the
Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1996) (describing central problem
in post-War Japanese constitutional law as dilemma of mediating between the communal
norms traditional to Japanese society with the regime of individual rights of the Japanese
post-War constitution); Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A
Story of New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127 (1994) (Japanese
institutions harmonized the provisions of the Showa Constitution with traditional norms
and customs).
52. A recent example of this tendency in the courts of Latin America involves the
Chilean Supreme Court, affirming the determination of the Chilean administrative body
banning the exhibition of the motion picture, The Last Temptation of Christ. See Olmedo
Bustos y Otros vs. Chile, Series C No. 73 (February 5, 2001) available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/SERIE C/C 73 ESP.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2001)
(determining that the right to exhibit this motion picture was protected under international
concepts of human rights). For a discussion of the background of the this case, see
Derechos Humanos, La Ultima Tentaci6n de Cristo, El paradigma de una sociedad por el
conservadurismo?, available at http://www.derechoshumanos.cl/ultima/index.html (last
visited Dec. 28, 2001). For a discussion of the difficulty of Argentine courts with the
post-Dictatorship regime of international human rights, see Janet Koven Levit, The
Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L.281 (1999) (the Supreme Court of Argentina has either declined to interpret
human rights treaties or has twisted international law against individuals who seek
compliance).
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human rights movement with the endogenous human dignity traditions of
nation states is a necessary prerequisite to the success of any attempt to
naturalize human rights through legal education in the Americas.
To a large extent, then, for those academics sharing the
understandings and assumptions with which I started this analysis, 53 it
would appear clear that in order to be effective, education must be a tool
for the assimilation of universal principles of individual human rights.54
The universities must consciously engage in a sort of missionary activity;
to work as the vanguard of changing cultural norms and expectations.
This missionary activity must cultivate fundamental changes in
communities at the national and sub-national levels, and among all
religious, ethnic, and indigenous communities inhabiting the Americas.
This is difficult work for academics; as the tools of a universalizing
creed, academics will have to overcome the tension between one of the
core norms of universal individual human rights-respect for cultural
differences-and the purpose of the universal individual human rights
project itself: requiring conformity within all cultural communities of a
53. See discussion at notes 6-10, supra.
54. Assimilation of universal norms is a prerequisite to an effective naturalization of
human rights norms within any society.
[A]ssimilation functions as the consequence of the significance of socio-
cultural taboos to the dominant culture. As a culture assigns a higher value to a
particular taboo, that culture becomes willing to expend greater effort to ensure
conformance with that command or prohibition, and to extract greater penalties
for its violation. That effort is the species of assimilation with which I concern
myself here. Like taboos, assimilation or conformance is selectively blind.
That is what we commonly understand as toleration, what we might more
profitably describe as indifference. For example a significant cultural taboo
may forbid idleness. A group that forbids its members to practice certain
professions (money lending) may be tolerated as long as the dominant taboo is
not violated. The dominant culture insists only that all who reside within its
influence be productive-it is indifferent to the forms of productivity, or, for
that matter, to any individual or sub-group restrictions on the range of
productive choice. On the other hand, there does exist discrimination in the
nature of a dominant group's tolerance of deviance. A group that insists that it
will not work unless it can be paid a certain minimum for its services (perhaps
a decent or "living" wage) will not find the dominant group indifferent. Unlike
the belief structure of the first group, the application of the latter group's beliefs
results in a violation of the dominant groups core taboo. That latter group will
be compelled to comply. In this sense it may not be so surprising that society
could characterize the non-conforming sexual and reductive habits of some in
the society in apocalyptic terms .... Assimilative forces pervade systems built
to guard culture rules. Equality of opportunity is assimilationist; equality of
result is paradigm exploding.
Larry Catd Backer, Poor Relief Welfare Paralysis and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. REv.
1 ("The tune to which we dance is set by our socio-cultural taboos. Taboos compel
assimilation. Assimilation assures avoidance of taboos. It is a significant social good in
the eyes of any dominant group. "Id., at 4-5).
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set of basic transcendent conduct norms.55 Academics, in their role as
teachers, must be prepared to further a set of meta-norms which cannot
be disputed, and which must be protected against incursion in the name
of national tradition or culture or religion or ethnicity or indigenous
56status. This assimilative project requires a continual stripping of the
sovereignty of states.57 It requires an acceptance of a system of political
organization in which sovereignty is divided, and the state assumes a
subordinate position with respect to the fundamental rights of the
individual.58 It is ironic that legal education in the western hemisphere,
if it is to be truly effective in accordance with the assumptions earlier
made, would have to be based on a commitment to a fundamental
normative understanding that would strip core norm-making authority
55. The transcendence of the universalizing principles of individual human rights
does not suggest that all sub-universal communities would be stripped of all of their
normative powers. There is room for the parochial within systems of universal norms -
to the extent at least that the local does not adversely affect the universal. See Larry Catd
Backer, Forging Federal Systems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict: The Example of
the European Union, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1331 (1998) ("Today, Europe keeps
potentially incompatible systems of culture norms firmly in check. The non-political and
non-normative expression of culture is protected. Everything else is suppressed." 1d).
56. Clifford Geertz correctly describes the cultural dimension of teaching and
enforcing the new regime of universal individual human rights when he reminds us that:
[C]ulture is best seen not as complexes or concrete behavior patterns -
customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters - as has, by and large, been the case
up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms - plans, recipes, rules,
instructions (what computer engineers call 'programs') - for the governing of
behavior.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 44 (Basic Books, 2000) (1973).
This notion has found recent echoes in the legal literature. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman,
Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 643 (2001); Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural
Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640 (2001). Cf JACK M. BALKIN,
CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998) (relating culture, personhood, and
historical existence to the controlling mechanisms of information as "cultural software").
57. Isaiah Berlin reminds us of the ideological dangers of nationalism for any
universalist project.. In particular, nationalism, when fused with statism, exhibits four
characteristics dangerous for any universalizing normative project:
the belief in the overriding need to belong to a nation; in the organized
relationships of all the elements that constitute a nation; in the value of our own
simply because it is ours; and, finally, faced by rival contenders for authority or
loyalty, in the supremacy of its claims.
Isaiah Berlin, Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power, in ISAIAH BERLIN, AGAINST
THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 333, 345 (Henry Hardy, ed., Random
House 1997) (1979). Elizabeth Kiss has argued that nationalism and human rights are
not necessarily related. See Elizabeth Kiss, Is Nationalism Compatible With Human
Rights? Reflections on East-Central Europe, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 367
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds., 1997).
58. The Europeans have made a great advance toward this sort of system within the
evolving European Union. See Larry Catd Backer, The Extra-National State: American
Confederate Federalism and the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 173 (2001).
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from independent communities and transfer this authority to a much
larger global or regional community made up of a number of member
states. The European Union has shown us the way: it has commenced
this very project at the political,59 as well as at the educational level.6°
Within this normative ordering, the rights system as well as the teaching
of the rights system of the United States, at least, would appear
aberrational.
Incorporating universal individual human rights as part of the basis
for the teaching of the social and political organization in the United
States requires a substantial reorientation by U.S. law teachers. Such an
incorporation entails liberation from the deeply ingrained provincialism
that has characterized the teaching of human rights in the United States
as one thing for United States and another thing entirely for everyone
else. There can no longer be one set of indigenous 'constitutional' rights
for U.S. citizens and residents, and another set of externally imposed
'international human rights' for everyone else in the Americas. Law,
perhaps starting with Constitutional law, must become an integral and
integrated part of the curriculum of universal human rights laws
applicable consistently throughout the Americas. To do less could easily
be characterized as affirming a hypocrisy, a racism, and an ethnocentrism
at odds with much of the rhetoric of the current liberal establishment of
rights discourse within the United States.
In the rest of the Americas, the embrace of universal individual
human rights requires a greater domestication within the rich human
rights traditions of Latin American states. No longer ought these norms
be taught as the imposition of outsiders. Instead, the universal can be
naturalized or reconceived within a revised pedagogy as a generalized
expression of basic and unalterable principles with specific connection to
specific local social and political traditions, behavior, and organization.
It requires the naturalization of the universal within the national legal
cultures of the various states. The universal must be accepted as an
59. See Larry CatA Backer, Forging Federal Systems Within a Matrix of Contained
Conflict: The Example of the European Union, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1331 (1998).
60. The Erasmus and Socrates programs have gone a long way in that direction.
Commentators have noted that "[t]he Erasmus-Socrates Program is a massive program
for educational exchange at university level in all disciplines of science including law. It
was initiated by the European commission in 1989 and has spawned ever since dozens of
university networks for educational exchange in Europe." Frans J. Vanistendael, Blitz
Survey of the Challenges for Legal Education in Europe, 18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 457 (2000)
(discussing efforts since the 1999 Sorbonne-Bologna Declaration to harmonize university
education within Europe through ": (a) comparability in academic degrees, (b) a uniform
structure of the university curriculum in all disciplines and (c) a common system of
transfers for course credits." Id., at 460). See also, Jo Shaw, From the Margins to the
Centre: Education and Training Law and Policy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 555
(Paul Craig and Gr~inne de Bhrca, eds., Oxford, 1999).
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elaboration of the domestic.
At the same time, legal education must be far more sensitive to
national parochialisms. The universalizing doctrines of fundamental
individual human rights are much like the universalizing doctrines of the
Catholic Church during the Late Antique.61  The Catholic Church,
hungry for converts, faced significant resistance, from traditionalists
within the leadership of invading barbarian tribes as well as within the
old pagan elite. Similarly, modem proponents of a universalizing human
rights regime face significant resistance from the modem
traditionalists-nationalists, sub-national communities, and socio-
religious ideologues. The early Church was aware that universalism
without converts was dead letter. The Church was willing to bend to
parochialism in the ultimate service of the universal.
Gregory the Great's famous letter to the Abbot Mellitus, advising
that pagan temples in England be used for the worship of the Christian
God that people ad loca quae consuevit, familiarius concurrat, and that
the sacrificial animals of heathenism be now devoted to Christian
festivals, agrees with the responsa of the same pope to Augustine
concerning the choosing of local customs best suited to the conditions of
the converted.62
That principle should be taken to heart by human rights educators
across the Americas.
Universal individual human rights is always in danger of treatment
as hollow rights when it has failed to become rooted within the
normative structure of nation-states.63 Teaching universal individual
human rights law as something 'outside,' as something to be used against
national law becomes something invasive. This amounts to the use of
61. For background, see, e.g., BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE
1050-1300 (1964); RICHARD W. SOUTHERN, WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH IN THE
MIDDLE AGES (1970).
62. William A. Chancy, Paganism to Christianity in Anglo-Saxon England, in
EARLY MEDIEVAL SOCIETY 67 (Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., 1967).
63. "When countries are rewarded for positions rather than effects- as they are
when monitoring and enforcement of treaties are minimal and external pressure to
conform to treaty norms is high-governments can take positions that they do not honor,
and benefit from doing so." Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). 1 here suggest turning on its head the classic
argument of cultural relativists who suggest that a universal human rights is subject to the
vagaries of cultural difference. I am suggesting that universalism that fails to become
translated into the rights language of the receiving state will always be subject to
treatment as foreign and on that basis, temporary. For an example of the classic form of
the culture matters in human rights discourse, see, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im,
Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural
Imperatives, 3 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 13 (1990); R.P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong with
Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV.
HuM. RTS. J. 29 (1993).
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law as a colonizing power.64  The result is likely to be resistance and
failure.6 5 There is some evidence of this dysfunctional consequence of
teaching universal individual human rights as an imposition from
above.66 To succeed, the enterprise of universal individual human rights
must be willing to use the temples of national law for the worship of the
new god of human rights, to use the sacrificial animals of community
norms for the celebration of the rights of individuals. We in the 21st
century Americas are still very much like the 6 th century pagans of
England - the way to the salvation of the people of the Americas may
well also be similar. That task will require that universal principles find
parochial expression. It may require that the language of individual
human rights speaks through the federal constitution in the United States,
and in the language of each of the several local communities that
comprise the rest of the Americas.
My contribution, then, is based on balance. Universal individual
human rights will neither be universal nor rights unless it is taught as
such in all of the Americas, and taught in such a manner that similar
situations produce similar results throughout the Americas. This requires
a significant adjustment in the curriculum of American law schools based
on an acceptance of the supra-constitutional basis for the rights of the
citizens and residents of the United States. 67 At the same time, universal
64. On the colonizing power of law in the context of the regulation of Native
American governance in the United States, see, e.g., law as a colonizer, see, e.g., Philip
R. Frickey, A Common Law For Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999). See generally,
JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL.2: LIFEWORLD AND
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 355, 392 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1987). Cf George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 467 (1994) ("The use of law by colonizers to execute and
rationalize oppressive policies, notably the acquisition of native lands for European
settlement, is poorly explained as an effort to gain the consent of thoroughly dominated
indigenous populations. Rather, it is argued here, the use of law under such
circumstances reflects the needs of dominant colonial groups to maintain internal
cohesion and morale, and, to a lesser extent, to gain international approval for their
policies." Id, at 470-471).
65. Thus, some have argued that "a pivotal states human rights policy must be
sensitive to cultural variation and not insist on standards to which only advanced
industrial societies can be held" if these states are to develop sustained and naturalized
cultures of human rights. Charles H. Norchi, A Pivotal States Human Rights Strategy, in
THE PIVOTAL STATES 315, 332, 333 (Robert Chase et. al. eds., 1999).
66. See, e.g., Olmedo Bustos y Otros vs. Chile, Series C No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001)
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/SERIEC/C 73_ESP.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2001).
67. While I readily concede that this is not the case today-recall the United States
continues to go its own way on human rights-it may be the inevitable conclusion to the
globalism and convergence that the United States, among others, has been pressing on the
world since 1945. Even if the United States never concedes the primacy of international
human rights norms, it will be confronted by a world that increasingly seems inclined to
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individual human rights remains an empty letter to the extent it remains
an 'outsider' to the normative structure of a political community. Such a
regime of norms must be naturalized - made parochial as well as
universal. This naturalization may require the greatest adjustments in the
curriculum of the law schools of the Americas outside of the United
States.
II. Some Evidence of Legal Parochialism and Hollow Universalism as
Fatal Methodology
Merely offering a course for students neither suggests the relative
importance of the course for student development nor does it suggest its
content. As law faculties have been aware for a long time - curriculum
matters.68 The perceived importance of a course, the nature of the way it
is taught, and its connection to other courses in an integrated curriculum
are all matters that significantly affect the power of a course. Law
schools in both the United States and Latin America have made
methodological determinations that substantially affect the impact of
human rights courses in the curriculum. In the United States, human
rights is a marginalized field of study, consigned to the field of foreign or
international law. In Latin America, human rights forms a more central
part of the curriculum but becomes marginalized to the extent it is taught
as foreign law. It is true enough that part of the reason for the present
state of human rights education in the curriculum is historical.
International human rights, as law affecting individuals, and as a group
of somewhat enforceable legal obligations imposed on states, is a recent
phenomenon, postdating by many decades-and in the case of many
Latin American civil law states, centuries-the setting of the form and
move in that direction, and who will seek to arrange their relationships with the United
States on that basis. But see Justice O'Connor's comments, infra note 117.
68. Indeed, the great battles over the nature of legal education have focused on both
what is taught to whom and how. For a discussion of the early battles leading to the
adoption of the case method of study, the Socratic method of teaching, and the
implementation of a curriculum heavily weighted toward the teaching of courses on the
common law of property, contracts and torts, see WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994); ROBERT
BOCKING STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s To
THE 1980s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1983); Anthony Chase, The
Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329 (1979). For a discussion of
the battles over curriculum in U.S. law schools in the 20th century, see, e.g., Frank J.
Macchiarola, Teaching in Law School: What Are We Doing and What More Has to Be
Done?, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 531 (1994); Richard B. Lillich, The Teaching of
International Human Rights Law in U.S. Schools, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1993)
(discussing the exclusion of international human rights courses from law school
curricula).
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basic content of the legal education curriculum. 69 Its late arrival on the
legal scene might help explain the reason that the curriculum seems to
'make room' for this set of legal upstarts only begrudgingly. Yet enough
time has passed to make the excuse of the youthfulness of international
individual human rights less than satisfying. Are there more principled
bases on which the continued state of curricular affairs can comfortably
rest?
A. U.S. Legal Parochialism
The current state of curricular parochialism in U.S. law schools is
well known.
Most American law schools have not made significant progress in
integrating international perspectives with their domestic law courses.
The more common strategy has been to add a select number of courses in
international and comparative law. A recent ABA survey showed that 90
percent of the schools responding offered five or more international
courses, and 84 percent offered comparative law courses.7v
This sort of parochialism is also easy enough to illustrate. One
example will suffice. Consider the following course placement and
descriptions of a law school ranked within the 'top 50' in a popular press
ranking for 2001.71 The basic course in Constitutional law is grounded
on basic governmental ordering and the consideration of a few of the
more significant fundamental rights as constructed from out of the U.S.
Constitution.72 Advanced courses in fundamental rights within the
United States also key in closely to the federal Constitution.73  In
69. For an interesting history of the emergence of human rights as objects of legal
regulation, see, e.g., Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the
Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HUM RTS. Q. 447 (1992).
70. Margaret Y. K. Woo, Reflections on International Legal Education and
Exchanges, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 449 (2001).
71. Best Graduate Schools 2001; Law Schools, U.S. News and World Report, April
10, 2000, at 73.
72. The course description for the basic Constitutional Law course reads as follows:
This course is a study of basic principles of constitutional law. The primary
focus will be on the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First
Amendment, the guarantees of federalism and the separation of powers.
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog, 2001/2002, Constitutional Law, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=347 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2002).
73. Thus, for example, the course description for Civil Rights Litigation provides:
This course will provide an introduction to the procedural and remedial aspects
of enforcing civil rights-both constitutional and statutory-in the federal courts.
Much of the course will be devoted to study of the basic federal civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the parallel Bivens cause of action. Topics may
include: the rules of individual and official liability and, conversely, of official
and sovereign immunity under Section 1983 and Bivens; standing and
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contrast, the courses on international human rights appear to stop at
national border.14 The clinical component of the course, an exceptional
course offering outside of elite institutions, also tends to an outward
75gaze.
justiciability doctrines that frequently arise in civil rights litigation; the
availability of damages and other remedies in constitutional tort cases; and the
rules governing the award of attorney's fees. The class will then consider
problems arising under other federal civil rights statutes, both of
Reconstruction-Era and of modern vintage. We will place special emphasis on
the increasingly important question of the scope of Congress's constitutional
authority to enact civil rights legislation.
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog 2001/2002, Civil Rights Litigation, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=355 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2002). The description of the advanced course in Church State Law provides a
similar inward looking focus:
This course will explore issues arising under the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Attention will be given to Supreme
Court decisions concerning government aid to education, tax exemption of
religious institutions, conscientious objection, disputes over church property,
and similar topics. The aim of the course is through the exploration of
particular problems to develop a general theory of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment and of the constitutional ideology that underlies these
clauses. As groundwork for this effort, the course will explore the historical
background of the religion clauses with particular emphasis on church-state
systems in colonial Massachusetts and Virginia and the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment.
Id., Church and State, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog
/catalog.php?op=show&id=445 (last visited Aug. 11, 2002).
74. The course description for International Human Rights provides that:
This course describes and critically examines the underpinnings, norms,
institutions, and processes of the human rights movement as it has developed
over a half century. It instructs in those aspects of public international law that
are vital to understanding human rights. Its topics and continuing themes
include: ancestry and character of the treaty and customary law of human
rights; the relation between human rights and the humanitarian laws of war; the
universal or culturally particular nature of human rights; rights-oriented and
duty-oriented approaches; the significance of the public-private divide for
human rights law; the relation between civil-political and economic-social
rights; the functions and evolution of intergovernmental institutions of the
universal (UN) and regional (African, European, Inter-American) human rights
regimes; dilemmas of implementation and enforcement of human rights norms
in relation to sovereignty and political fragmentation; the vital role of non-
governmental human rights organizations; and internal application of human
rights norms by states. Illustrations drawn from the human rights movement
inform these topics, from gender discrimination and the right to health to
prosecution of war criminals and problems of religion and state.
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog, Human Rights and International Law, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=461 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2002).
75. The course description provides that:
This seminar introduces students to human rights advocacy through readings
and class discussion of critical issues in the human rights movement and
participation in supervised projects. The clinical projects will involve work
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There are a number of things that these descriptions reveal. First,
there is a curricular division between individual rights affecting citizens
and residents of the United States, usually the subject of a basic or
advanced "Constitutional Law" course, and the general human rights of
foreigners, usually the subject of a course in "International Human
Rights. 76  While the occasional human rights casebook written for
American law schools makes a reference to its utility within the United
individually or in small groups in collaboration with human rights non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies. Class sessions
will be divided between case studies of advocacy from the recent history of the
human rights movement and student-led discussions of their clinical projects.
The case studies will explore issues faced by human rights advocates including
priorities, strategies, and understandings of what constitutes a human rights
problem. In particular, the studies will explore the human rights response to
problems like apartheid, human rights violations in strategic states (e.g., Israel),
violations of women's human rights (including female genital mutilation and
trafficking in women), and the increasingly important role of international
business and globalization.
All students will work on a clinical project involving: (1) a significant research
component; (2) close collaboration with a human rights organization; and (3)
participation in some ongoing process such as a UN session or NGO
investigation or court proceeding. In recent years, these projects have involved
a range of topics including corporate responsibility, trafficking in women, and
the growth of national human rights commissions. Unlike domestic clinical
work, the projects will only rarely be based on judicial proceedings
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog, Seminar: Human Rights Advocacy: Clinical,
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=518
(last visited Aug. 11, 2002).
76. This division is apparent in the treatment of immigration law, which in the
United States has come to be almost exclusively focused on the practicalities of
immigrant status within the United States. The course description provides:
This course examines the constitutional and-civil rights of immigrants in the
United States. The course extends the treatment of non-citizens' rights found
in the Immigration Law and Constitutional Law courses, and analyzes a broad
set of problems involving anti-immigrant discrimination. The course explores
the rights of immigrants and refugees in immigration proceedings, including
removal hearings and detention, as well as in areas such as criminal justice,
education, employment, the political process, and access to government
benefits. The course also analyzes and critiques civil rights laws that address
discrimination based on national origin, immigration status, and U.S.
citizenship. In addition to covering discrimination based on formal citizenship,
the course examines the intersection of citizenship and race; in particular, the
course analyzes problems arising when racial and ethnic minorities encounter
discrimination because they are perceived to be foreigners, regardless of actual
citizenship status. The course also devotes attention to language rights and
problems of language discrimination,. including English-only policies in
government and in the workplace.
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog, Civil Rights of Immigrants, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=446 (last visited
Aug. 8, 2002).
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States, it is more often clear that the two categories of courses are not
meant to provide different perspectives on governance or legal issues
affecting the same set of people. There are a very small number of
exceptions. One of the most interesting involves the law of indigenous
people.77 Perhaps another are courses in Comparative law. 8 But courses
in comparison are focused on a different object: these courses study self-
contained systems for a number of reasons other than because the laws
might or ought to be binding within the home jurisdiction.79
77. A course offered by two visiting professors with significant experience-in both
domestic and international law aspects of the legal position of indigenous people provides
that:
This course examines the contemporary international human rights framework
for understanding the unique problems raised by indigenous peoples' legal
claims to lands, cultural autonomy, and treaty-based rights. Emphasis will be
given to the developing international and domestic law and legal standards
respecting indigenous peoples' rights, particularly in the United States, but also
in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America, and Asia. The problematic
structural influences and weight of colonial era rules and principles on
indigenous peoples rights developed under the European law of nations and the
increasing receptivity of the international human rights process towards the
active monitoring and investigation of abuses of indigenous peoples human
rights occurring under domestic law regimes will be explored in depth in the
course. Special attention will be devoted to major topics in United States
Federal Indian Law, including tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction, the trust
doctrine, and treaty rights, utilizing the human rights framework and
comparative indigenous rights perspectives from other countries developed
during the course.
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog 2001/2002, Indigenous Peoples' Rights, available
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.phpop=show&id=419 (last
visited Aug. 11, 2002).
78. Consider, for example, the description of a comparative U.S. South African
Constitutional law course:
This course will examine American and South African constitutional-legal
materials primarily from the. standpoint of the American constitutional lawyer
making the acquaintance of South African constitutionalism. We shall look
constantly to see how the light shed by South African constitutional choices
and developments might sharpen ourdescriptions, deepen our understandings,
and enrich our evaluations of American choices and developments. In addition,
we shall try to consider how differences in national history and situation may or
may not be aptly reflected in both differences and likenesses in constitutional
choices and developments.
Harvard Law School; Course Catalog, Comparative Constitutionalism: South Africa and
the U.S.-Equality, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog
.php?op=show&id=447 (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
79. Professor Donald Kommers has described four principle benefits of the
comparative study of constitutional law: (1) it can provide valuable insights into the
experiences of other constitutional democracies; (2) it can be helpful in working through
issues of what the 'perfect' constitutional order would look like, and in this matter inform
local constitutional thinking; (3) it can enrich the study of comparative politics; and (4) it
enriches the study of American constitutional law by providing a richer critical
perspective for understanding US constitutional jurisprudence. Donald P. Kommers, The
Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J., OF PRAC. & PROC. 685
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.Second, rights related courses are almost universally inward looking
in scope. The outer walls of nearly every rights related course within the
U.S. curriculum starts and ends with the U.S. Constitution.8" There is
perhaps in some a somewhat wistful look at other instruments, but even
with respect to this, academics have preferred to carve out a new area of
endeavor - comparative constitutional law - rather than incorporate
international, transnational or comparative materials within the standard
constitutional or constitutional rights law course. 81  But generally, any
such look is consigned to the 'if there is time' pile - interesting but not
critically relevant material for students to learn. The effect is
reinforcement of the tendency to avoid naturalization of the idea that the
emerging normative structure of international human rights, expressed as
formal law, has a place within U.S. jurisprudence. Conversely, human
(1976). See also VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW v (Foundation Press, 1999) ("Being able to think systematically about different
structures for organizing a government, and different approaches to establishing just,
effective, and stable forms of government while providing the flexibility for the future
that is required .to meet changing needs and ensure continued stability are general benefits
of studying these materials.").
80. Thus, for example, Professors Newman and Weissbrodt argue that international
human rights is worth studying because (i) "the subject deals with many concerns that are
also the focus of civil liberties and civil rights law." DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN
FITZPATRICK AND FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND
PROCESS xxxii (3d ed., 2001); and that (ii) even if a litigant exhausts remedies under U.S.
national law, "there may be international tribunals or other bodies to which they can take
their case." Id.
Advocates should also be aware that there are arguments based on international
law that clearly should be raised in U.S. federal and state courts, as well as in
legislatures and administrative agencies. For lawyers in many other countries
there are even more opportunities to raise issues based on international human
rights law. Civil liberties and civil rights attorneys arguably breach their
professional responsibilities if they represent clients and stay ignorant of
international laws and procedures.
Id.
81. For an example of the new genre casebook, see VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK
TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (NEW YORK: FOUNDATION PRESS, 1999).
82. The strength of this unconscious divide can be seen in the description of an
advanced course in Discrimination:
The goal of this course will be to learn about selected elements of our current
antidiscrimination regime that are currently under particularly interesting
academic scrutiny, both to study parts of the regime that are now thought to be
particularly problematic or inchoate, and to develop some idea of the analytic
approaches being developed to assess them. Thus, we will not undertake a
systematic detailed overview of all antidiscrimination law; rather, we will
select for particular scrutiny distinct elements of it, such as intent, the tension
between status-based and efficiency-based theories of discrimination, hostile
environment and other novel theories of harm, and accommodation mandates.
This course will combine two approaches. Half the meetings will be devoted to
the study of legal rules and doctrines currently in place in constitutional and
statutory antidiscrimination law.
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rights courses look outward, to courts and venues outside the United
States, and deal with issues and problems and legal frameworks with
little formal or practical connection to American law.
83
This division is reinforced by the structure and content of course
books produced for the teaching of these courses.84 Even if one were
inclined to consider rights regimes other than our own, at least as
currently formulated, one would have a difficult time finding
instructional materials - casebooks in particular - to make such an
approach easy. Casebooks reinforce and help naturalize the idea that the
study of American rights regime and the rights regimes of other parts of
the world remain separate fields entirely. In the usual case,
"constitutional law" casebooks obsess about the legitimacy and extent of
judicial review of the actions of individuals and the institutions of the
various levels of our government. The books then proceed to discuss the
substantive results of judicial consideration of the division of powers
between the state and general governments and among the components
of each,85 and the extent to which the constitution serves as a basis for
the limitation of the powers of government to do or not do certain things
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog, 2001/2002, Discrimination, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=452 (last visited
Aug. 10, 2002).
83. This tendency occurs even in courses with potentially significant relation to
issues affecting segments of the American population. Consider in this respect the course
description for a course on Sex Gender and Human Rights:
This course will examine issues of sex and gender in the law of human rights.
It will begin with a discussion of the concepts of sex and gender and the
scholarly and political debates about their meanings. It will then turn to the
ways in which sex and gender are constructed, particularly in the international
arena. It will analyze the way that sex and gender are represented in the human
rights canon, and discuss the value of the women-specific human rights treaties
and institutions. The course will also examine the way in which ideas of sex
and gender have influenced the 'mainstream' human rights bodies and focus in
particular on the strategy of 'gender mainstreaming' developed in the UN and
European Union.
Harvard Law School, Course Catalog 2001/2002, Sex, Gender and Human Rights,
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=402
(last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
84. Indeed, the exceptional course, Indigenous Peoples' Rights, was based on
"Readings [taken] from multilithed materials." Harvard Law School, Course Catalog,
Indigenous Peoples' Rights, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students
/catalog/catalog.php?op=show&id=419 (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
85. All of this together usually comprises the core of a typical 3 hour credit one
semester course in American Constitutional Law. In four credit semester courses, an
introduction to the constitutional law of individual rights is also included. Within these
confines, casebook organization is increasingly flexible enough to "allow[] users to
'structure their own courses in their own ways." WILLIAM COHEN AND JONATHAN D.
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS v (2001).
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(the "individual rights" portion of the course).86 The teaching goals of
such materials typically includes:
the following: (1) the types of accepted justifications for the exercise
of the power of judicial review; (2) the influence of different eras of
American legal thought on constitutional decision making; and (3)
how to name (and then utilize) regularly recurring forms of legal
argument."
87
Inward looking, the typical casebook materials make difficult even
limited efforts to include discussion of the approaches of other regimes
to similar issues.
The teaching materials for the basic human rights course respect this
division as well. The primary emphasis is on the history and
development of a law of state-to-state obligations centering on the
creation of norms meant to protect individuals and communities, a study
of various international and supra-national frameworks developed or in
development with respect to the construction, enforcement of these
supra-national human rights norms, and an introduction to some of the
more important substantive norms of this international system.
However, international human rights casebooks do attempt some
coverage of international norms in a domestic context. In the case of
textbooks prepared for the American market, there is some sometimes
significant coverage of domestic remedies for human rights violations
within the U.S. and U.S. judicial remedies for violations occurring
outside the U.S. 88  For casebooks devoted to the availability of
international law in U.S. litigation, the focus tends to be on process
86. For a nice summary of this basic characterization, see, e.g., CHARLES A.
SHANOR, TEACHER'S MANUAL To ACCOMPANY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION 1-7 (2001). Some casebook authors attempt a nod at
an exploration of "the role that legislatures, the executive, and other political institutions
(for example political parties and social movements) played in constitutional
decisionmaking." PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS xxix (2000).
87. MICHAEL ARIENS, TEACHER'S MANUAL: GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M.
SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AND MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3 RD ED. 1996)
at xxiii. See also DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY vii-viii (1998)
(two major purposes of introductory course, the first is to provide a grasp of judicial
doctrine and the second is to understand how judges wrestle with basic questions about
the nature of American society).
88. Chapters 13 and 14 of the casebook, DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK AND
FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS (3d ed.,
2001) are devoted to a consideration of these issues. See also Louis HENKIN, GERALD L
NEUMAN, DIANE F ORENTLICHER AND DAVID W LEEBRON, HUMAN RIGHTS (1999)
(covering international and domestic contexts).
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rather than any substantive area.89 The problem in this case, of course; is
practical rather than formal. In a two or three credit hour semester class
in international human rights it is more likely than not that the materials
on domestic application will be given shorter shrift. The substantive
division reflects the determination by the larger law book publishers in
the U.S. that international human rights constitutes a specialty category,
rather than something more basic to the law school curriculum. 90 To
ameliorate the problem, some authors have attempted the creation of a
'human rights module,' a short course within a larger course, focusing on
international human rights issues in situ.91 However, the legal academy
has thus effectively constructed a legal pedagogy within the United
States in which the amalgamation of instruction in rights regimes is
deemed aberrational in fact in courses devoted to individual rights within
the United States, notwithstanding the gesture of inclusion as a separable
item of specialty study within the curriculum of some law schools.
To a large degree, then, instruction in individual human rights is
relegated to a curricular Never-Never Land in the United States. The
important courses in individual rights, with pride of place in the
curriculum, are all essentially courses in insular law. Human rights is
catalogued with those other curiosities making up the curriculum in the
specialized area of international and comparative law. We start by taking
for granted the walls separating national from international rights
regimes, and base a curriculum on that notion. The ironies of this are
great indeed. U.S. law schools effectively build a curriculum solely on
the basis of current and parochial rights doctrines generated by the
Supreme Court.92 This suggests that such doctrine is either as permanent
89. See, for example, JORDAN J PAUST AND JOAN M FITZPATRICK AND JON M VAN
DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (focusing on
procedural issues in connection with cases touching on international law).
90. Thus, for example, in advertising INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra, note 89, West Publishing Company suggests that the casebook
might be "[u]seful in other specialty courses, especially human rights courses or
seminars." Thompson/West, Paust, Fitzpatrick, and Van Dyke's International Law and
Litigation in the United States (American Casebook Series®), Features and Benefits,
available at
http://www.westgroup.com/store/product.asp?productid=18257965&catalogname
=wgstore (last accessed August 11, 2002).
91. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, MICHAEL P. SCHARF, JIMMY
GURULt, LEILA SADAT BRUCE ZAGARIS AND SHARON A. WILLIAMS, HUMAN RIGHTS
MODULE: ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, GENOCIDE, OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND WAR CRIMES (2001) (providing a self-contained set of materials focusing on
crimes against humanity, genocide, and other war crimes for use in seminars or other
courses in international human rights or in general international law courses. Id., at ix
(Preface)).
92. Again, at this point I should emphasize that I am not arguing against the teaching
of law as it is currently formulated by the courts. Rather, I argue here, with particular
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and absolute as the word of the Divine - which most law professors
would concede is not the case - or that law professors themselves are
proponents of this division - which most faculties would deny.
Parochialism, pedagogical inertia, and institutional impediments, rather
than tradition, conviction, or principle, appear to account for the
perpetuation of this division in the teaching of individual human rights in
the United States.
93
B. Latin American Hollow Universalism
Latin American education in international individual human rights
plays a more central role within the curricula of prominent law schools.
Yet there remains a great disconnect between the curriculum and the
practice within Latin American states. The problem here is essentially
methodological. But methodology in this case has great substantive
focus on the approach to teaching about 'human rights,' that such a narrow and
particularized approach does a great disservice to our students. The American courts
have always shown a willingness from time to time to reconsider fundamental positions,
and change them. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896); Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Teaching to the past
without an eye on possible avenues of change for the future, while it requires a
substantial amount more work on the part of faculty, ought to form an important
component of our teaching mission. This argument should not be read to imply any
necessary agreement with what one teaches - but it does suggest an obligation to prepare
our students for the world they will face by equipping them with what they will need to
do their jobs well. Ironically, the most useful analogy might be best suggested the person
with a strong personal belief in the error of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), each of whom must teach the law as it exists
within existing jurisprudential confines, but also may suggest the context in which those
confines exist today and the possible alternatives future courts or legislatures might be
free to follow.
93. The United States, among common law countries, does not have a monopoly on
Legal parochialism in the field of human rights. The National Law School of India, a
relatively young school in Bangalore, has devised a program of undergraduate legal
studies that mimics both English and U.S. approaches to the study of fundamental rights.
Fundamental rights is taught as the second part of a two part comprehensive study of the
Indian Constitution. The course description for Constitutional Law II is similar to the
similarly named class in many U.S. law schools. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - II
The course is exclusively devoted to a detailed analysis of fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by Part III and complemented by fundamental state policy
adumbrated in Part IV and both these reinforced by the provisions in Part IV-A
of the Indian Constitution. Through incisive and comparative analysis of case
law, the students are enabled to realise the status and importance of
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles and to examine the problems
involved in their judicial enforcement. The chapter on Fundamental Duties will
also be studied in the course and an effort will be made to articulate the basic
values which the Indian Constitution has identified and is attempting to
actualise for justice and governance.
The National Law School of India, Bangalore, India, Undergraduate Courses, available
at http://www.nls.ac.in/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
effect. The disconnect is understandable given the thrust of the human
rights project since the end of the Second World War. Richard Falk, in
considering the effect of human rights on the erosion of state power,
explains that:
The cumulative influence of human rights as legal norms gave the
notion of external accountability an increasing credibility, at least in
Western Europe, especially after the creation and operation of the
Strasbourg human rights mechanisms within the framework of the
European Community, which took the radical step of allowing
citizens in the participating countries to challenge alleged
infringements of human rights in external administrative and judicial
94arenas.
The analogous organs of the OAS were meant to extend that model
to the Americas. External accountability and citizen standing before
supra-national bodies effectively limits the power of a state to thwart or
mold a human rights regime to suit itself. However, at its extreme,
external accountability and norm setting can obliterate the indigenous
traditions of human dignity that have, to some extent, shaped the global
approach to human rights. In an effort to limit the power of rogue
governments in the future to trample on human rights, human rights has
been made essentially exogenous. But exogenous law, with no
foundation in indigenous traditions, can also be treated as irrelevant, and
foreign, by both the people it is supposed to protect, and the national
institutions charged with its implementation or against whom the
exogenous protections have been instituted.
The traditional civil law methodologies of instruction, so ingrained
in Latin America, make the teaching of a treaty and convention based
supra-constitutional law of human rights neither natural nor, within the
traditional curriculum, easy. Virtually all Latin American Countries
adhere to the civil law tradition.95 Law is substantially limited to
legislative or administrative enactments in written form. The answer to
all questions can be found in the Codes. The judiciary, like the legal
profession, is meant to apply rather than interpret that statutory law.
Legal education mirrors this approach to law. Much instruction is based
on a familiarization with the national and local law Codes and other
pertinent legislation. The core indigenous codes usually include a civil,
94. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 96 (Polity Press,
1999).
95. Virtually all Latin American states "are solidly within the civil law tradition and
have contributed their own characteristic Latin American variation to it." JOHN
MERRYMEN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS ix (1990).
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criminal, commercial and civil procedure code. Other codes may include
labor, corporation, and public law codes.96
This form of traditional instruction, deeply ingrained in Europe and
Latin America, has found some critics within Latin America. For
example, Martin Bohmer, the dean of the law school at one of the private
universities in Argentina, has made an argument for a move to a mode of
instruction that emphasizes the patterns of thinking encouraged through
use of the Socratic method.97 Consistent with the normative basis of the
European civil law tradition from which it derived, Argentine law is
principally based on written codes in which judges apply, but do not
interpret, the law. 98 That relationship between judge and law replicates
itself in the relationship between student and teacher within law schools.
Instruction in law often reduces itself to little more than a memorization
of the Codes, with no emphasis on critical thinking. 99
As a result of the heavy emphasis on the traditional codes,
international law tends, on the one hand, to be relegated to the periphery
of the core of study, and, on the other, presented as foreign, rather than
domestic, law. The applicable national effects of international human
rights law is sometimes a part of a course in national constitutional law,
or is included in the mandatory international law course. At the
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the mandatory Constitutional
Rights course contains a section discussing the sources of constitutional
law, which includes, among others, international treaties. 00 In Brazil,
96. For a general introduction to the general forms of legal education in a civil law
context (with emphasis on French and German models), see, RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER,
HANS BAADE, PETER HERZOG AND EDWARD M. WISE, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT,
MATERIALS 340-374 (1998).
97. Martin F. Bohmer, Algunas sugerencias para escapar del silencio del aula
(paper on file with the author) at 8.
98. Martin F. Bohmer, Algunas sugerencias para escapar del silencio del aula
(paper on file with the author) at 8. The French Civil Code still provides - "Il est
drfendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition g~ndrale et rrglementaire sur les
causes qui leur sont soumises." C. Civ. Art. 5. Indeed, Dean Bohmer refers to the
general conception of law in Argentina as Napoleonic. Id., at 8, citing among others
CARLOS NINO, ALGUNOS MODELOS METODOL6GICOS DE 'CIENCIA' JURiDICA (Valencia,
Spain, 1980); CALOS NINO, LA DOGMATICA JURIDICA (Mexico, 1974).
99. Martin F. Bohmer, Algunas sugerencias para escapar del silencio del aula
(paper on file with the author), at 9 ("La habilidad que se califica es la merea memoria.
La cuesti6n es, en general, demostrar que se puede repetir lo que dijo el docente en clase
que es a su vez la repetici6n de lo que dice el manual, que repite lo que dice de C6digo.").
Dean Bohmer suggests that while this traditional mode of instruction might at one time
have been useful in building a unified state, it does little service for a nation attempting to
create democratic, free market state. Id., at 9. As a result, the role of law faculty "no es
otro que hacer conocer a los alumnos el contenido de esos c6digos." Martin F. Bohmer,
Sobre la inexistencia del derecho de interns pzTblico en Argentina, 3 REVISTA JURIDICA DE
LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PALERMO 131, 139 (April, 1998) (Argentina).
100. Pontifica Universidad Cat6lica de Chile, Derecho Constitucional, DEL101A-
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after reforms in the 1990s, that curriculum now includes mandatory
courses in Roman Law, International Law, Jurisprudence, Civil Law,
Procedural Law, Criminal Law and Constitutional Law.10 l  At the
University of Sao Paulo Law School, international human rights is
incorporated, to some extent, in a mandatory fourth semester course on
fundamental rights - Direitos Fundamentais.1°2 The course is divided
into two parts. The first examines generally the concepts and
classifications underlying international notions of fundamental rights.
103
The second part of the course concentrates on the regime of fundamental
rights within Brazil. 104 This section of the course is limited to the
substantive rights available under the Brazilian constitution and the
procedures available for their vindication. 105
III. First Steps Towards Solution - An Example in that Direction?
It is an easy matter to argue, as I have, for a blending of the
parochial and the universal when teaching - and practicing - human
rights within a nation-state. It is, likewise, simple to demonstrate that the
methodology of the current pedagogy is imperfect. It is quite another
matter, however, to convince law teachers that this methodological
problem is one worth correcting, and harder still to illustrate how this
correction might be accomplished in fact.
Fortunately for those of us in the Americas, academics elsewhere
have taken some very interesting and potentially useful steps in that
DEL101B, available at http://cursos.puc.cl/catalogo/programas/del 0 la-del 0 lb.pdf (last
visited Aug. 12, 2002). Among the books used in the constitutional law class, see, Jost
Luis CEA EGA&qA, CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITUTCIONAL (4 vols., Santiago, Chile, 1994-
95); HARNAN MOLINA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (Concepci6n, Chile, 1992); JORGE
MARIO QUINZIO, I Y II TRATADO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (Santiago, Chile, 1993-
94); M. VERDUGO, E. PEIFFER AND R. Vio, I Y II DERECHO CONSTITUTCIONAL (Santiago,
Chile, 1994).
101. Nadia de Araujo, The Status of Brazilian Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC.
325, 327 (2001). In Brazil, unlike other Latin American states, the Ministry of Education
regulates the curriculum. Id.
102. See Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de So Paulo, Curso de Graduag[o
2001, at 9 (Ciclo Bisico), available at http://www.usp.br/fd/catalogograduacao/2001/
index.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2002). The catalogue for 2002 is substantially the same.
See Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Slo Paulo, Curso de GraduagIo 2002, at 9
(Ciclo Bcisico) available at http://www.usp.br/fd/catalogograduacao/2002/index.html
(last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
103. See id., at 112. This section includes a study of the initial universal declaration
of rights, the rise of social and economic rights, and third generation human or basic
rights. It also includes a discussion of modem public rights and international systems for
the protection fo those rights. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The substantive rights include the right to life, liberty, equality, and property.
In addition, the course includes consideration of remedies for breaches of constitutional
rights. Id.
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direction. Consider for example the way in which courses on 'civil
rights' are taught at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. That
course contextualizes New Zealand's civil rights regime within that of
'modem liberal democracies' including the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom, and then examines this legal order in light of
international human rights instruments.'0 6  Here is an attempt to
contextualize universal human rights within the particular legal context
of New Zealand. The universal and the parochial work together to
advance the universalizing project of a single standard of individual
fundamental human rights.
The benefits of such an approach are fairly easy to understand.
First, such an approach can significantly enrich an understanding of
indigenous approaches to the protection of individual rights within the
structuring of the parochial legal system being studied. Second, this
contextualizing approach can accomplish the 'enrichment' function
while remaining true to law as actually being practiced. Third, this
approach can offer a faculty member the opportunity to provide students
with insights not only with respect to current regimes of constitutional
interpretation, but also to potential alternatives, which whether the
students or their instructor like them or not, will likely confront the
practitioner, as well as the theoretician, more often as the century wears
on.
Moreover, international human rights teaching need not be confined
to the constitutional law or human rights course ghetto. There are
alternatives available for spreading the introduction to principles of
106. The course description published by the University sets forth the content of the
course as follows:
The course objective is to examine the role of civil liberties in the context of
modem liberal democracies and particularly the New Zealand experience. The
general theory will include a critical review of individual rights and
responsibilities under different notions of liberalism and in competing notions
of communitarianism. The Canadian, American and English 'Bill of Rights'
will be briefly considered before an analysis of the New Zealand legislative and
common law regimes. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human
Rights Act 1993 will be examined in some detail, along with threshold
questions of constitutional entrenchment and the peculiar political context of
New Zealand democracy. The impact of international human rights
instruments on New Zealand law will also be considered, with particular
reference to issues of statutory interpretation, discretionary decision-making by
the Executive and judicial review of such Executive action. The right of
individual communication under the Optional Protocols to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination
of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) will also be
analysed.
University of Canterbury, Undergraduate Courses 2001, LAWS 344 CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1st half of the year) Half Course, Course Supervisor: Mr. G Leane, available at
http://www.laws.canterbury.ac.nz/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2001).
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international individual human rights across the curriculum. In a way
analogous to what critical race theorists have demonstrated to us with
respect to race, 10 7 human rights issues touch virtually every traditional
course in the curriculum.108 Damages for torture, for example, can be as
much the topic of basic tort law as it is a subject of a course in 'human
rights." 0 9 Sex crimes are as much a matter of human liberty and dignity,
at the core of national and international human rights norms, as they
might be just another topic in a course on criminal law. l"0 Forced
107. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race
and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Scholarly
Paradigms: A New Tradition Based on Context and Color, 16 VT. L. REv. 913 (1992);
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); citing Charles
R, Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DuKE L.J. 431.
108. As Dean Claudio Grossman has suggested:
We need to create such linkages because in our new global reality even
'domestic' lawyers will at some point in their careers have to address issues of
international law. At WCL we have made revisions to the first year curriculum
to incorporate international issues into traditional first year 'domestic' law
courses. For example, a first year torts class studies the Paquete Habana case,
a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1900 on the basis of customary
international law. The students also study cases brought by foreign nationals in
U.S. Courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act. These cases help students
understand the outer limits of the application of U.S. laws abroad as well as the
application of treaty law and customary international law within the U.S. First
year students are also exposed to internacional legal research in their Legal
Methods course.
Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges for Legal Education, 18
PENN STATE INT'L L. REv. 441, 446-47 (2000).
109. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1980) (The court
awarded Paraguayan citizens compensatory damages, including attorney fees, and
substantial punitive damages against Paraguayan official for the torture and death of their
brother and son); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2 nd Cir. 1995).
110. This certainly has been the case within Europe with respect to sodomy
legislation. Compare Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (Ser. A No. 142)(1988)
(Irish buggery and gross indecency laws applied to adult private consensual activities
violated Art. 8(s) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (finding no constitutionally protected right against state legislation
criminalizing sodomy between people of the same sex). It has not been uncommon to use
the criminal laws of sexual conduct as a means of political coercion. There is a long
history of this in the Western world. For an example from Stuart England, see, e.g.,
CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, A HOUSE IN GROSS DISORDER: SEx, LAW AND TE 2 ND EARL OF
CASTLEHAVEN (1999) (analysis of trail and execution of the second Earl of Castlehaven
for assisting the rape of his wife and committing sodomy with his servants). For a
modem version of the story of the 2 nd Earl of Castlehaven, one need only turn to late
twentieth century Malaysia where the ruler sought to use the sodomy laws to eliminate a
strong political opponent. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Malaysian Ex-Oficial Convicted of
Sodomy; Defense Argued That Charge Was Part of Plot by Premier, Wash. Post, Aug. 8,
2000, at A17, LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe; John Gittings, Sex claims in Anwar
trial fuel gay fears, Guardian, Nov. 4, 1998, LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe. Robert
Mugabe, 21 st century Zimbabwe's dictator has been using a manufactured set of
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eviction is more than a section of a course on property; it is tinged with
issues of human rights and personal freedom. As an alternative, some
schools have instituted a short 'bridge' course, usually in the week before
a student's second year studies commence, in which students receive an
introduction to the relevance of international and comparative law issues
in traditional areas of practice.' Thus, the New Zealand approach, in
some form, may provide a clue to the construction of an international
individual human rights tinged course for U.S. law schools which
remains true to the reality of current of current law within which the
global legal positivist discourse of legal rights can be contextualized for
local consumption.
There exist several significant impediments to any movement in this
direction. The addition of international and comparative themes to
existing courses, and especially existing first year courses, may present
fatal obstacles. Traditional courses are already crowded with
information, requiring abbreviated presentation of important domestic
substantive issues. Also many instructors might be uncomfortable with
unfamiliar materials. The result might be faculty resistance to this sort of
innovation. If international and comparative human rights issues are
woven into advanced courses, there is no guarantee that students may
take the course in sufficient numbers to be effective. 112 Moreover, the
lack of readily available teaching materials may pose another significant
obstacle. It is difficult enough to teach a traditional course when
materials are readily available. For many faculties, the additional burden
of creating one's own materials, especially with respect to subjects that
may be less familiar, may create an insurmountable barrier to any
movement."13  Moreover, busy faculties tend to prefer to follow the
'customary' law to promote the primacy of heterosexual African males within the social
and political organization of the state. See, e.g., David M. Bigge and Amelie von
Briesen, Conflict in Zimbabwean Courts: Women's Rights and Indigenous Self
Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289 (2000) (examination of
case of Magaya v. Magaya to show how women are accorded an inferior status to men in
Zimbabwean courts in light of colonial influenced customary laws). For popular press
accounts, see, e.g., Andrew Meldrum, Mugabe Steps Up Attack on Gaus,
GuARDiAN(London), Aug. 19, 1995, at Pg. 13, LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe; Alec
Russell, Attacks on Gays by Mugabe Seen as Political Smokescreen, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Aug. 25, 1995, at pg. 14, LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe.
111. Mark A. Drumbl, Attainable Globalization: International and Comparative Law
'Bridge Course, 'in Workshop on Shifting Boundaries: Globalization and Its Discontents,
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, January 4, 2001, San Francisco,
California at 7, 9-13 (copy on file with author).
112. Mark A. Drumbl, Attainable Globalization: International and Comparative Law
'Bridge Course, 'in Workshop on Shifting Boundaries: Globalization and Its Discontents,
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, January 4, 2001, San Francisco,
California at 7 (copy on file with author).
113. This barrier, however, may be becoming less formidable. Faculty are
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strong incentive structure provided by conventional professional
expectations. The pull to follow the currently conventional thinking of
the judiciary, and the inertia exerted by the traditional division of
subjects within a law school curriculum, all tend to create barriers to any
change in current approach.
Balanced against these obstacles are the emergence of additional
and newer pedagogies for naturalizing international individual human
rights within the law schools. Among them, clinical education has great
potential both as a means of teaching individual human rights in context
and as providing an essential bridge between theory in the classroom and
practice in the everyday life of the legal community. Clinic and clinical
faculties are in the optimum position not only to weave international
human rights themes into their courses, but also to formulate and put
forward in court those arguments that might have an effect on the ways
in which American courts approach human rights norm making the




Human rights as an international normative project with positive
law effects must find its way into the core of U.S. individual rights
instruction. The fact that the current Supreme Court, and the current
legislative and executive branches, have not yet conceded the
application, is hardly an excuse for ignoring the applicability of these
regimes within the United States. It would hardly have struck law
professors as odd to teach the possibility of error in the reasoning,
approach, or result of Plessey," 5 even prior to Brown." 6  Yet, by
effectively failing to incorporate international human rights norms within
increasingly encouraged, even by textbook publishers, to create their own sets of
materials from out of those currently published. For example, both West and Lexis
publishing have established programs for the preparation of individualized course
materials for a variety of materials they each publish. In the near future, it may be easier
to combine materials from multiple texts (for example from traditional constitutional law
and human rights texts) published by the same entity in the creation of materials for a
course.
114. Clinic programs have undertaken this role to some extent already. This is
especially the case in connection with immigration issues. For a discussion and example,
see, e.g., American University International Human Rights Law Clinic (explaining that
students also work on projects that influence or create U.S. policy on international human
rights), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/inter.html (last visited July 10,
2002).
115. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (arguing against the affirmation of the
racial separate but equal doctrine).
116. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting constitutional
protection for doctrine of separate but equal treatment of races).
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domestic discussions of legal rights, law faculty effectively engage in a
very similar practice with respect to the foundation and approach to
human rights in the United States. Indeed, Members of the American
Supreme Court have begun to warn legal academics, among others, of
the coming turn in law. In May 2002, Justice O'Connor "suggested that
the Court will increasingly come to rely on 'international and foreign law
in resolving what now appear to be domestic disputes."' 1 17 She predicted
that since "international and foreign law are being raised in our courts
more often and in more areas than our courts have the knowledge and
experience to address... expanded knowledge in this field" is
important. 
118
Moreover, the result should be the same if the institutions of our
government, with the approval of the people of our nation, were to
continue to reaffirm, over and over again, the fundamental principle of a
necessary division between domestic and international rights regimes.
Even in such circumstances, the international foundation of human rights
would intrude on American law whenever it would be necessary to deal
with nation states that have acceded to those principles.119 Moreover, as
Calvin Massey has suggested in another context, to study American
Constitutional law, "[o]ne needs to ask why the doctrine is the way it is,
to determine whether it is justifiable in terms of the fundamental
premises of constitutional law, and to propose alternative ways of
expressing our constitutional principles."' 20 And those principles may
creep into American jurisprudence through their adoption in treaty
instruments involving the United States. Again, the Rome Statute
provides a case in point, creating an international criminal law regime
based on interpretations of human rights norms that might be rejected
under American law.'21  The North American Free Trade Agreement
117. Justice O'Connor Predicts Greater Domestic Reliance on Norms of
International Law and Praises Institute's Increasing Transnational Focus, 24(4) THE
ALI REPORTER 3 (Summer 2002) (quoting in part, Justice O'Connor). Justice O'Connor
was also quoted as observing that while "inter-nation law and the law of nations are
rarely binding on our decisions, conclusions reached by other countries and by the
international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American
courts -what is sometimes called 'transjudicialism." Id., at 3, 6.
118. Id.
119. Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing
Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1198 (The evolution of
CIL raises concerns of whether this internationalization of domestic law undermines the
executive sovereignty and whether a judicially internationalized law of nations threatens
the normative structure within which the interaction among sovereigns takes place. Id.).
120. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES
xxvii (2001).
121. Senator Chris Dodd (D. Conn.) Perhaps expressed this well when, through his
spokesperson Tom Lenard, he suggested that "The court is going to be making
international law in the future, and it would be better for the United States to be a leader
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
provides another. 122 For all these reasons, human rights ought to be freed
from the bonds of its institutional ghetto within legal education.
Yet, it should be lost that the aim in this endeavor, as in most
worthy endeavors, is to effect a change in fundamental cultural norms.
Integrating universal individual human rights into the curriculum of
parochial rights courses (that is, making it natural to treat local issues of
constitutional fundamental rights-as part of the larger fabric of universal
and international individual human rights) will make it easier to
incorporate such universal individual rights into the social reality of the
nation-states of the Americas. In a related study of the production of
culture, Pierre Bourdieu has noted that
Cultural legitimacy appears to be the 'fundamental norm', to employ
the language of Kelsen, of the field of restricted production. But this
'fundamental norm', as Jean Piaget has noted, 'is nothing other than
the abstract expression of the fact that society 'recognizes' the
normative value of this order' in such a way that it 'corresponds to
the social reality of the exercise of some power and of the




Universal human rights will become a reality in the Americas only to the
extent it becomes a lived reality. That requires an investment in its
reality by law teachers, as well as the institutions of the nation-state - the
courts, the legislatures, the military. As law teachers we can do little
directly with respect to the institutions of government. However, we can
assert our power, as the teachers of the coming generations of lawyers,
judges, and those other actors within the formal institutions of the state,
to begin to adjust that which is accepted as 'normal.' As the parents of
and a participant, rather than an idle observer." Quoted in Christopher Marquis, U.S.
Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield Its Peacekeepers: Response to New Court, Romania and
Israel Are First to Agree Not to Extradite Americans for Trials, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7,
2002, at A-1, A-8. indeed, some argue that Americans are beginning to feel efforts to
marginalize the United States as a significant contributing voice in the international
construction of human rights. Cf. Stephen G. Wood and Brett G. Scharfs, Applicability of
Human Rights Standards to Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 531, 533-538 (2002).
122. For an argument that the dispute resolution mechanism of the North American
Free Trade Agreement violate Article II of the Federal Constitution, see Demetrios G.
Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141 (1994). See generally, A. Mark Weisburd, International
Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877 (2000).
123. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 141 (Randal Johnson
ed. Columbia University Press, 1993) (originally Le marchi des biens symboliques, in
L'ANtE SOCIOLOGIQUE 22 (1971), trans. R. Sawyer 14/1-2 POETICS (Amsterdam) 13-44
(April 1985) (citing J. Piaget, 3 Introduction t 'dpist~mologie gdn~tique 239 (Paris:
Universitaires de France, 1950).
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future generations of those in control of the field of legal production,
those who believe in the necessity of a universal system of individual
human rights have a duty to do no less.

